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Taming Red Lion: The First 
Amendment and Structural 
Approaches to Media Regulation 
By Monroe E. Price* 
INTRODUCTION 
There are orphans of the law, and the fairness doctrine' 
may fast become one of them. Its finest hour, perhaps, was in 
1969, when the Supreme Court, eight to nothing, held the doc-
trine. constitutional.2 But now that the power of Congress and 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been es-
tablished, there is much more sober reflection about the wis-
dom of the fairness policy. The signs of orphanness are strong. 
The missing Justice in Red Lion, Mr. Justice Douglas, subse-
quently went out of his way to say that had he participated, he 
would have held the doctrine unconstitutional.3 Mr. Justice 
Stewart has shown signs of a change of mind.4 And in the 
• Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. This Article is adapted from a 
speech delivered at the Federal Trade Commission's Conference on Media Concen-
tration, Washington, D.C., December 15, 1978. I am most appreciative of the help-
ful and illuminating suggestions I received from Professor Stephen Shiffrin of die 
UCLA School of Law. 
I. The fairness doctrine imposes upon broadcasters an affirmative duty to 
devote a reasonable amount of air time to coverage of public issues and to provide 
an opportunity for presentation of opposing viewpoints. In re The Handling of 
Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the 
Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d I, 7, 30 R.R.2d 1261 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Fairness Report]. See generally EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF 
FREE EXPRESSION 653 (1970). 
2. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
3. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
4. Id. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring). In discussing Red Lion, Justice Stewart 
said that due to "the unique electronic limitations of broadcasting, at least in the 
then-existing state of the art," the Court "fr/ightly or wrongly . .. decided that 
215 
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famous Tornillo case,5 which everyone but the Court seemed to 
think revolved around Red Lion, the fairness case was not even 
cited. There is more tumbling around. After its policy of re-
quiring fairness was vindicated, the Commission started 
backing away from aggressive access decisions that were outer 
extensions of the doctrine.6 And one of the architects of au-
thority for the FCC, a driver of power, then Chief Judge 
Bazelon, has officially recanted.7 
None of the foregoing is to suggest that the Court will offi-
cially repudiate the fairness doctrine. Since Tornillo the Court 
has cited Red Lion on several occasions, 8 carefully refraining 
from outright overruling, but also carefully limiting the extent 
of its embrace. What is happening, in terms of first amend-
ment vibration, is quite important. Coming almost to the edge 
of the content regulatory cliff in Red Lion, there has been a 
general retreat. Concerns about concentration,9 about diver-
broadcasters' First Amendment rights were 'abridgeable.' " Id. at 146 (emphasis ad-
ded). He also noted that he had agreed with the Red Lion decision "with considera-
ble doubt, because I thought that much Government regulation of program content 
was within the outer limits of First Amendment tolerability." Id. at 138 (emphasis 
added). 
5. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Here the 
Supreme Court overruled a Florida "right to reply" statute which granted political 
candidates newspaper space equal to the space used by the newspaper in criticizing 
the candidate or attacking his record. The Court held that the statute intruded on 
the editorial function and infringed on freedom of the press under the first and 
fourteenth amendments. 
6. The FCC in 1967 ruled that cigarette commercials implicitly raised the is-
sues of desirability of smoking and of related health hazards and thus triggered the 
fairness doctrine. In re WCBS-TV, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.2d 
921, 11 R.R.2d 1901 (1967), affd sub nom., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). But in 1971 , the Commission at-
tempted to reverse field by ruling that automobile advertisements did not raise the 
issues of desirability of using cars and of related air pollution hazards. In re Friends 
of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 19 R.R.2d 994 (1970), rev'd, Friends of the Earth v. 
FCC, 447 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The agency since has exempted "ordinary 
product and service commercials" from the fairness doctrine. Fairness Report, 
supra note I, at 24-26. 
7. See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE 
L.J. 213 [hereinafter cited as Bazelon]. 
8. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3037 (1978), where Justice 
Stevens joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger resorted to Red Lion 
as they affirmed the regulatory proscription of certain indecent language on televi-
sion at the time and in the context of that broadcast. See also First Nat'l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (1978). 
9. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) 
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sity, w about access'' remain intense, perhaps justifiably so; but 
something deep inside was suggesting that the progress of the 
law was moving headlong in a difficult direction. There is 
more of a search for alternative approaches. Structure has 
been identified as a prime candidate for reform, replacing con-
tent regulation as a method for achieving first amendment 
goals. 12 
Increased emphasis on structure is happening for at least 
three reasons. First, an empirical point: the fairness doctrine 
was designed to enhance the discussion of controversial issues 
of public importance, yet the evidence is not great that the doc-
trine contributes to that goal; indeed, there are indications that 
it is counterproductive. 13 Second, the cases seem to be moving 
toward a concept of editorial autonomy that is inconsistent 
with aggressive implementation of fairness requirements. 14 
(affirming FCC rules barring future creation or acquisition of newspaper-broadcast 
combinations). 
IO. See Fairness Report, supra note I, at 1-3. 
11. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters not 
required to accept paid editorial advertising). 
12. Government measures to encourage a multiplicity of newspaper outlets, 
for instance, have been described as a course of action that is "far preferable" to 
content-oriented regulation. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 627 
(1970). Judge Bazelon has identified the "major project for reform [of the telecom-
munications media] to be an increase in programming competition." Bazelon, supra 
note 7, at 238. 
13. The fairness doctrine has been singled out as being one of the most signifi-
cant contributors to bland rather than controversial programming. Since most 
broadcasters are profit-oriented, they may be reluctant to raise a controversial issue 
for fear of estranging an advertiser. CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
187-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, Power in the Marketplace of 
Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 764 
(1974); Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine: The New FCC 
Policy in Perspective, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. l083, 1111 (1975); Green and Lewis, A 
Fair Break for Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the 
Needfor/ndividualAccess, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532, 560 (1971); Comment, 
Evaluation of the Basis for and Effect of Broadcasting's Fairness Doctrine, 5 
RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 167, 179-80 (1973). 
14. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the view "that every potential speaker is 
the best judge of what the public ought to hear," reasoned that "[f]or better or 
worse, editing is what editors are for. [And although] editors . .. can and do abuse 
this power, . . . that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress provided." CBS v. 
Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973). And the Court has concluded 
that "[i]t has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial 
process (of editorial control and judgment) can be exercised consistent with the First 
Amendment guarantees of a free press or how they have evolved to this time." 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
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Third, the new technology provides the basis for a new roman-
tic notion that structural intervention on a wholesale basis is 
possible and will lead to increased diversity and access. 15 
This Article will sketch the shift in emphasis from regula-
tion of content to regulation of structure and suggest the 
emerging first amendment guidelines that might influence the 
government, the industry and public attitudes in the next few 
years. 
I. SOURCES OF THE SHIFT TOWARD REGULATION OF 
STRUCTURE 
A. The Regulatory Objective and the Results of Regulation 
As a form of social engineering, the implementation of the 
fairness doctrine over the last fifteen years is subject to ques-
tion. 16 The logic of implementation has occasionally been so 
extended and the methodology for determining whether a fair-
ness objection exists so tortured and intrusive that the risks of 
carrying controversial programming have been increased. 17 
Affirmative obligations of the fairness doctrine aside, there 
may, in fact, be a truly chilling aspect of the doctrine. Regula-
tion may restrict rather than enhance speech. To the extent the 
regulatory agency is entitled to make a prediction about the 
impact on diversity, courts may for a long while go along with 
the FCC, even if they have their own doubts as to the first 
15. Videocassettes, videodiscs, pay television, cable television and satellite dis-
tribution systems have been mentioned as prospective servants of diversity that will 
provide viewers and listeners with unprecendented alternatives. See Price, Requiem 
for a Wired Nation, 61 VA. L. REV. 541 (1975); Rappaport, The Emergence of Sub-
scription Cable Television and its Role in Communications, 29 FED. COMM. B. J. 301 
( 1976); Gerlach, Toward the Wired Society: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals for a 
National Policy on Cable Technology, 25 MAINE L. REv. 193 (1973); Note, Commit-
tee on the Future of Broadcasting, 40 Moo. L. REV. 460 ( 1977). 
16. See note 13 supra. 
17. An NBC television documentary on private pensions was the subject of a 
complaint that the program overemphasized the negative aspects of such plans. Al-
though the network indicated that some pension plans worked, the FCC at first 
determined that the program was one-sided and violated the fairness doctrine. A 
series of court and Commission rulings and reconsiderations on the same case led to 
no final resolution on the merits, as the matter was vacated as moot. In re Com-
plaint of Accuracy in Media, Inc., Against NBC, Memorandum, Opinion and Or-
der, 44 F.C.C.2d 1027, 1035, 28 R.R.2d 1371 (1973), rev'd sub nom., NBC v. FCC, 
516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated as moot upon rehearing en bane, id. at 1155, 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). See also American Security Council Educ. Foun-
dation v. FCC, No. 77-1443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1978). 
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amendment efficacy of the particular regulatory policy. Put 
differently, assuming that a regulatory agency has a constitu-
tionally proper authority to make rules that would enhance di-
versity, and the agency purports to do so, courts will hesitate to 
judge on their own whether the agency action, in some real 
world sense, actually achieves the objectives which it set out to 
achieve. 18 Assuming the constitutionality of the fairness doc-
trine and similar content-related rules as established by Con-
gress and the FCC, it would generally be proper for the court 
to give due deference to interpretive efforts of the agency. 19 
There are limits to deference, however, and judges are some-
times influenced by their own intuitions about the effect of a 
rule on the real world. 20 
B. Attitudinal Shifts: Regulation and the First Amendment 
Supporters of a full-blown fairness approach to program 
diversity have more than empirical skepticism to deal with. 
The future course of first amendment law may be more with 
the absolutist approach of Tornillo than with the experimental, 
creative, interventionist and balancing approach of Red Lion. 
There has been the incipient suggestion that the "freedom of 
the press" clause provides a certain editorial autonomy that is 
independent of "freedom of speech."21 Red Lion, looking to 
the speech rights of the listener, oddly discounted the licensee, 
perceiving the station as the carrier rather than the speaker. 
Subsequently, however, there has been much more focus on 
18. The Supreme Court has noted "that Congress has chosen to leave such 
questions (as access] with the Commission, to which it has given the flexibility to 
experiment with new ideas as changing conditions require." CBS v. Democratic 
Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973). The Court thus expressed its belief "that 
nothing in the language of the Communications Act or its legislative history com-
pels a conclusion different from that reached by the Commission." Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 25-34 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 
S. Ct. 621 (1978) (the D.C. Circuit struck down most of the Commission's "pay-
cable" rules) . 
21. Stewart, "OrofthePress", 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975); Nimmer, Introduc-
tion-ls Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of 
Speech?, 1d. at 639. It is important to note that the Chief Justice has disassociated 
himself from this view in his concurring opinion in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. 
Ct. 1407, 1426 (1978). The Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 
547 (1978), can also be seen as an indication that a majority of the Justices do not 
believe that the press possesses any greater first amendment rights than do individ-
ual citizens. 
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the rights of "the press" as an institution and the place of tele-
vision licensees as elements of the press. 22 
Another important change, not textually based, has been 
the rather forceful cultural trend away from regulation, away 
from appreciation of the benefits of government intervention in 
the society.23 The "chain broadcasting" case in 1943 was the 
first occasion for the United States Supreme Court to address 
the problem of substantive regulatory power by the FCC. In 
that decision, NBC v. United States,24 Justice Frankfurter laid 
the basis for a positivist role for the FCC, asserting that the 
agency was more than a traffic cop and might really think 
about what kind of licensee could best carry out the ideals of 
the Communications Act of 1934. But it should be recalled 
that this was a time when there was a great urge to support the 
development of a central government and the admimstrative 
process. This was a period in which it was unusual for the 
Supreme Court to conclude that an administrative law initia-
tive was unauthorized, much less that the authorization was 
unconstitutional. 
It was not until twenty-five years later in Red Lion that the 
Supreme Court next turned to the issue of first amendment 
constraints on agency action. This was toward the end of a 
period in which a major effort had been to prod and resuscitate 
seemingly moribund agencies, to tear them from the grasp of 
their industrial constituencies and make them and the regu-
lated industries more accountable to the public. The tenor of 
the early 1960s had been to mobilize the authority of the FCC 
and its sister institutions and make them more aggressive in 
their efforts to accomplish Congressionally-delegated goals. 
There was more emphasis on hearing from the groups left out 
of the process and finding a way in which they could more 
consistently and effectively participate. As much as Red Lion 
22. One could conclude that "the press" has rights, but that a television station 
is not part of "the press," at least where it is not engaged in press-related activities. 
The tendency, for example, is to characterize cable operators (except to the extent 
they operate locally-originated channels) as technicians rather than editors, even 
though they make program choices to fill still scarce channels. Perhaps, however, it 
is too great an infringement of "press" rights to attempt to distinguish among press 
and non-press-related functions of privileged institutions. 
23. The most recent example of this can be seen in FCC v. Midwest Video 
Corp., 99 S. Ct. 1435 (1979). 
24. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27. (1943). 
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raised first amendment issues, it captured these other strains as 
well.25 For this was more or less a model agency effort. Stud-
ies in the late 1940s had laid the basis for initiation of the 
doctrine.26 Congress subsequently ratified the doctrine specifi-
cally.21 And the agency had used its rulemaking authority to 
promulgate the regulations in question in one case.28 Not only 
was there agency initiative, but it was democratic in its pur-
port, an experiment in improving harmful rigidities in the sys-
tem. 
In the years following Red Lion, particularly in recent 
years, there has been a perceptible change, a general cultural 
drift toward less statism in the society. Whether this is a rhe-
torical or an actual shift remains to be seen. But the first 
amendment, as an anti-statist encomium, is · likely to be more 
forcefully and bluntly interpreted. 
C. The New Technology as a Means Toward Diversity 
The third reason for a change in emphasis is the prospect 
that such new technologies as cable, satellite and videodisc of-
fer opportunities for a structuring of the media in which diver-
sity and access objectives can be achieved without content 
regulation. That has been the hallmark of the efforts that led 
to the 1972 Cable Report of the FCC and the rules that flowed 
from that Report. 29 For the Commission and the courts, there 
is the desperate hope that the abundance of frequencies and 
flexibility promised by the new technology will provide a way 
out of the constitutional and regulatory box of the fairness doc-
trine. 30 For those with an interest in access and diversity the 
25. See, e.g., Johnson & Weston, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to 
Purchase Radio and Television Time, 51 VA. L. REV. 574 (1971). 
26. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
27. Congress, in amending the statutory equal time requirement for political 
candidates in 1959, provided that the measure afforded no exception "from the obli-
gation imposed upon them (licensees) under this Act to operate in the public interest 
and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues 
of public importance." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1978). See also Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969). 
28. Fairness Report, supra note l; Memorandum Opinion and Order on Recon-
sideration of the Fairness Report, 5S--F.C.C.2d 691, 36 R.R.2d 1021 (1976). 
29. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 24 R.R.2d 1501 
(1972); 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617 (1977). 
30. The Supreme Court has indicated its own anticipation of such developments 
by noting that "at some future date Congress or the Commission---or the broadcast-
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trends in decisions and the feeble results of "fairness" decisions 
have led to a focus on the structural possibilities afforded by 
the new technology. 
II. DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A NEW EMPHASIS ON 
STRUCTURE 
A. Contingent Access Requirements Versus A Structural 
Approach 
It is not enough in a system of law to have cultural and 
technological forces shifting the emphasis from one approach 
to another. There also must be a legal underpinning which 
suggests, in an analytical way, why a structural approach is 
preferable to an approach to diversity which involves content 
regulation. 
Analysis must start with the semantic game of mystifica-
tion; only by increasing complexity at the outset can there be 
the catharsis of demystification. Professor Benno Schmidt, in 
his useful Twentieth Century Fund study, Freedom of the Press 
vs. Public Access,31 characterizes the fairness doctrine and sim-
ilar access rules as "contingent" access requirements. A con-
tingent access rule exists when access is triggered by something 
the publisher does, such as broadcasting a personal attack or 
one side of a controversial issue of public importance or selling 
ers-may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and 
desirable. Indeed, the Commission noted in these proceedings that the advent of 
cable television will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public is-
sues." CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973). The FCC has 
announced that the fairness doctrine is necessary until "effective development of an 
electronic medium with an abundance of channels." Fairness Report, supra note I , 
at 6-7. See also Price, Requiem fora Wired Nation, 61 VA. L. REV. 541 , 551-52 n.61 
(1975). 
3 I. B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. PUBLIC ACCESS (I 942). I am re-
ferring here to the so-called "second part" of the fairness doctrine. The first part of 
the doctrine, by contrast, imposes an affirmative duty upon the broadcaster to 
devote a reasonable amount of air time to coverage of controversial issues of public 
importance. While this portion of the doctrine could also be viewed as a contingent 
access requirement in the sense that the issue of public importance is the "triggering 
event," such a view would seem to blur unnecessarily the distinction between con-
tingent and non-contingent access. Clearly, if the non-contingent aspect of the doc-
trine were ever taken seriously (fortunately it is not), the Commission would have to 
establish a roll call of controversial issues for each community and demand that 
such issues be covered with "reasonable" time devoted to each. If contingent access 
requirements are too complex and too intrusive, part one of the fairness doctrine is 
simply impossible. 
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political advertising to one candidate. Contingent access re-
quirements pose special first amendment problems. They re-
quire the regulatory agency to determine whether the 
triggering event took place. And because there are risks and 
hazards associated with particular kinds of triggering $peech, it 
is less likely that the publisher or broadcaster will indulge 
them. ·Furthermore, contingent access requirements involve 
the regulating agency in complex and intrusive efforts to find 
appropriate remedies. 
In contradistinction to the contingent access requirements 
are structural approaches which provide for noncontingent ac-
cess. An example of a noncontingent access req~t is the 
compulsion wliich existed in the 1972 Cable Rules, 2 albeit 
much watered down in 1976,33 to furnish in certain cable sys-
tems a reserved channel for education, for goverment, for leas-
ing and for public access purposes. This year the Supreme 
Court negated the authority of the FCC to establish these 
particular noncontingent access requirements in the Midwest 
Video (II) case. 34 
An understanding of the reservation of channels,35 as in 
the cable rules, may be assisted by analogy. The analogy of 
32. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 189-92, 24 R.R.2d 
1501, 1557 (1972). 
33. In re Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 
294, 37 R.R.2d 313 (1976). 
34. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 99 S. Ct. 1435 (1979). Here mandatory ac-
cess, channel capacity and equipment regulation of cable TV by the FCC was struck 
down as exceeding the FCC's jurisdiction on the grounds that the Commission had 
no statutory authority and the regulations were not "reasonably ancillary" to the 
FCC's regulation of broadcast TV. 
In discussing this question with respect to cable, there is a threshold issue: 
namely, whether Congress authorized the FCC to engage in noncontingent reserva-
tions-i.e., reserving a channel on a system for educational uses or government uses 
or public access. The questions of general authority over cable were before the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) and 
in the first Midwest Video case (Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 406 U.S. 649 (1972)). 
It is only important for this discussion because a court, concerned about the consti-
tutional implications, may narrowly interpret the authority of the agency. I am as-
suming, for our discussion of policy implications, that a court would hold that the 
FCC or other agency was acting within its statutory authority. Thus the constitu-
tional issues must be faced. 
}5. A danger inherent in this area, it should be noted, is that government would 
be implicated in determining whether a dedicated channel was being used for its 
prescribed purpose. 
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disposition of public land has been used36 to help explain the 
alternatives open to the federal government in managing the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 37 The analogy is based, of course, 
on the famous perception, housed in a Senate Resolution that 
"the ether and the use thereof for the transmission of signals, 
word, energy, and other purposes is hereby reaffirmed to be the 
inalienable possession of the people of the United States and 
their government. ... "38 
This comparison of the spectrum to public lands is helpful 
because it indicates the flexibility and purposiveness of the 
management of public property. In the nineteenth century and 
even in the twentieth, the federal government used its power to 
relinquish portions of the public domain to achieve certain im-
portant social objectives. There were reservations of land to 
aid in the civilization of Indian tribes;39 land was set aside to 
support higher education or public schools;40 townsites were 
reserved for new communities.41 Through the Homestead 
Acts, land was issued in units that fostered, at least in the 
minds of the Congress, a kind of national ideal of family farm-
ing.42 Furthermore, land retained in public ownership was, 
and remains, classified by the Secretary of the Interior for vari-
ous kinds of uses43 (such as grazing, wilderness, mining or agri-
culture). 
This analogy is helpful in the sense that it provides assur-
ance that the sovereign can act rationally and with purpose in 
managing or disposing of public property. Its helpfulness 
dwindles, however, as difficult first amendment issues mount. 
Merely because the government has the power to dispose of 
public property does not mean that it can do so in a discrimi-
natory manner. Similarly, because the government can dispose 
of the spectrum or contract out its use, it cannot do so in a 
36. Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red 
Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978). 
37. 8. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1975). 
38. s. Res. 2930 reprinted in B. S C HMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. PUBLIC 
A CCESS 125 (1942). 
39. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D.C. Ore. 1888). 
40. 43 u.s.c. § 851 (1970). 
41. 43 u.s.c. §§ 713, 719 (1970). 
42. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed in 1976, but effective until 1986 for Alaska). 
43. 43 C.F.R. § 2070.3 (1977). 
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manner that violates first amendment rights.44 There is little 
doubt, however, that a classification scheme in frequency allo-
cation, like a classification scheme in public land disposition, 
would withstand constitutional scrutiny even in the post-
Torni/lo era. Just as a portion of the spectrum can be set aside 
for land-mobile, or national defense purposes, or for broadcast 
television and radio,45 classifications within the television spec-
trum can be made, with reservations for education, and per-
haps for other uses-such as sports or children's programming 
or news. 
Such a structural approach to licensing policy is signifi-
cantly more harmonious with the first amendment than the 
present licensing system. As discussed above, licensing at pres-
ent provides for contingent access46 with its hazardous implica-
tions for chilling the programming decisions of broadcasters.47 
Furthermore, diversity is achieved, if at all, through the diffi-
cult to articulate goals for news and public affairs.48 Imagine 
instead a licensing system in which channels are segmented 
44. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the argument that denial of a broadcast 
license was contrary to the first amendment, stated that "Congress did not authorize 
the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, eco-
nomic or social views or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or if the Com-
mission by (its) Regulations proposed a choice among applicants upon some such 
basis, the issue before us would be wholly different." NBC v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190, 226 (1943). 
45. The Communications Act of 1934 gave the FCC power to "assign bands of 
frequencies to the various classes of stations, . . . " 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1970). 
46. The FCC has considered strict adherence to the fairness doctrine to be a 
broadcaster's most important duty. Comm. for the Fair Broadcasting of Controver-
sial Issues, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.2d 283, 292, 19 R.R.2d I 103 
(1970), rev'd on other grounds, CBS v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
47. The possibility of intimidating broadcasters through the licensing process 
seems to have been especially well-recognized in this decade. Through its spokes-
man, the White House, in 1972, warned that stations which did not correct "network 
imbalance" or bias might find themselves in trouble at renewal time. THE POLITICS 
OF BROADCASTING 228-34 (M. Barrett ed. 1975). A tape recording revealed that 
President Nixon discussed the possibility of "retaliating" against the Washington 
Post via its broadcast licenses. N. Y. Times, May 16, 1974, at I. 
48. The FCC, for instance, has considered proposals for quantified standards 
with regard to what would constitute "superior" programming. But the agency has 
been reluctant to define a specific amount of local, news and public affairs program-
ming as "superior" for fear that most licensees would adopt that minimum level as 
their standard. In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal 
Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, Report and Order, 66 
F.C.C.2d 419, 427 (1977), ajf'd sub nom. Nat'l Black Media Coalition v. FCC, No. 
77-1500 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 13, 1978). 
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and portions licensed for differing purposes. An independent 
national news entity (or several) might be provided the license 
to program from seven to eight p.m. with the traditional licen-
see given only the remainder of the evening. Competing chil-
dren's networks could receive the licenses to broadcast on 
Saturday morning;49 other specialized entities could also re-
ceive a share of the spectrum . . 
This would be a structural solution, similar to the classifi-
cation of land, and would avoid some of the present entangle-
ments of current FCC policy (though undoubtedly new pitfalls 
would take the place of the old). Those who are internation-
ally inclined know that Independent Television in Great Bri-
tain somewhat follows this approach: London Weekend, for 
example, had control of a channel for Saturday and Sunday; 
ITV News, a separate entity, had the rights to the spectrum 
during a specified portion of each evening. Similarly, Dutch 
television, in its wonderfully pillaristic way, segments the time 
on each of the channels among broadcast entities representing 
proportionate shares of the subscribing population.50 
B. The Public Forum Issue 
One additional and important first amendment issue is 
raised by the analogy to land, namely the public forum prob-
lem, and it is instructive to consider it. If much is made of the 
fact that the frequency is public in nature and the licensees are 
trustees for the public,51 it is not surprising that the members of 
the public who have a hard time getting on will claim that they 
ought to have access just as they would to a soapbox in the 
comer park. 52 And, indeed, there is considerable litigation 
over the obligations of a municipal or federal officer who is in 
charge of a public forum and must assign rights to use that 
49. See, Comment, The FCC as Fairy Godmother: Improving Children's Televi-
sion, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1290 (1974). 
50. A. SMITH, THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE: THE BROADCASTER, HIS AUDIENCE, 
AND TH E STATE (1973). 
5 I. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383, 389 (1969); CBS v. 
Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973). 
52. Such a state action argument failed to carry the day with the Supreme Court 
in CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., id. Three justices concluded that licensee ac-
tion amounted to government action. But three justices found no basis for state 
action, two justices found state action irrelevant to the case, and one justice was 
unwilling to decide the issue. 
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forum to competing interests.53 
The power of analogy can take one too far in this area. It 
may be true, as Justice Roberts has said somewhat hyperboli-
cally, that streets and parks have "immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions."54 That does 
not mean that each state-owned or state-controlled space or 
opportunity must be treated the same.55 Even the park analogy 
does not prove the point. Let us take Central Park. It should 
be beyond doubt that a portion of the park can be dedicated to 
Shakespeare, another to the sailing of children's boats, another 
to a Hans Christian Anderson statue and another to a zoo. So 
opening the park does not, by itself, make each aspect of it a 
common carrier.56 The city is not required to provide equal 
access to playwrights if it leases the outdoor theater to Joseph 
Papp on a long term basis.57 
On the other hand, it is also possible and reasonable for a 
public entity that has a park, conducts public meetings or 
operates and manages frequency allocation to establish appro-
priate rules for access to that facility. 58 We have all been in-
volved with public bodies that seek to hear from the citizenry 
but recognize that the process of oral and written participation 
must be made subject to rules. In a court, this may take the 
53 . See, e.g., Fowler v. R.I. , 345 U.S. 67 ( 1953); see also Cox v. La., 379 U.S. 536, 
557-58 (1965). This is not necessarily the same question as was presented in CBS v. 
Democratic Nat'! Comm., in which the applicant sought to challenge the use of the 
spectrum by the licensee, not the allocation among competitors by the government 
itself. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
54. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). 
55. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that different characteristics in differ-
ent media justify differences in first amendment standards applied to them. United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 , 166-67 (1948). 
56. But see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
57. Furthermore, if the city leases the theater to Joseph Papp with the expecta-
tion that he will exercise his editorial discretion in the management of the theater, 
first amendment issues would arise if the city subsequently compelled access or 
otherwise attempted to exercise contol over the producer's own independent judg-
ment. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), the Court 
makes it clear that the government does not abdicate its first amendment responsi-
bilities by engaging in this type of proprietary activity. 
58. The Supreme Court has upheld time, place and manner regulations that 
assured advance notice to afford proper protection and to avoid overlapping uses. 
Cox v. N.H., 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). 
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form of the length of a brief that may be filed. In a public 
meeting, the rule may take the form of a limitation upon the 
number of minutes a speaker is allowed or the frequency with 
which he may appear at the tribunal's sessions.59 A park forum 
can be regulated like a tennis court, with the allocation of time 
and the requirement of advance reservation. Similarly, in 
broadcasting, there can be rules concerning the allocation of 
time among competing users so that there is some fairness in 
the distribution of what is a scarce resource. 
To this, a grace point may be added. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with the government contracting out its regu-
lation and management of a facility in accordance with access 
obligations. Furthermore, just as the government can use a re-
source for a dedicated purpose, it can lease or contract that 
resource for a dedicated purpose, without the requirement of 
constitutional necessity of access. 
Ill. DISTINCT REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS OF 
DIFFERENT MEDIA 
I have gone through this somewhat laborious exercise be-
cause of its implications for cable and the new technology 
rather than to suggest a possible avenue for the reformation of 
the broadcast licensing process. In a sense, the structural and 
classificatory model derived from the public land analogy is 
very much the model used by the FCC in dedicating channels 
on cable television systems. In the 1972 Cable Rules, as I have 
indicated, the structural approach of the FCC was to reserve 
channels for public access, for education, for government and 
for leasing.60 I am not concerned here with the statutory au-
thority for such an approach. But in terms of first amendment 
policy, the reservation and dedication of channels is far more 
preferable than the contingent access approach of the fairness 
doctrine. 
There is, however, one significant difference between ap-
plying the public land analogy to cable television and applying 
it to broadcast licensees. The spectrum is arguably public 
59. Bui see Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 
429 U.S. 167 (1976), indicating that with respect to public meetings, discrimination 
on the basis of content is not permissible. 
60. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra. 
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property; cable channels (and for that matter, newspapers) are 
not. This does not mean that cable, or newspapers, must be 
free of all regulation. It may mean, however, that first amend-
ment considerations are different because the government is 
not managing its own resources. Even now, one would have 
grave doubts about imposing a scheme that would reduce first 
amendment rights solely on the basis that a cable system was 
carrying a broadcast channel.61 And absent that, it is hard to 
imagine that because cable carries its messages below the 
streets (through ducts) or above them (along telephone poles) it 
has first amendment rights that are different from those of 
newspapers. 
Obviously, to the extent that cable is a utility and a natu-
ral monopoly like the telephone company, it should be recog-
nized and regulated as such. But here, it would be preferable 
from a first amendment perspective if cable's roles as a conduit 
and as a programmer were distinguished. The FCC, in the 
1972 Cable Rules, required cable operators to originate pro-
gramming.62 From a first amendment standpoint it might have 
been preferable if a cable operator, like a telephone operator, 
sold time on a nondiscriminatory basis and was not involved in 
the profitability of the message that was carried.63 
The current rules allow the cable operator to impose his 
own pay television system and to decide on programming that 
will be received through satellite or other mechanism on the 
other channels.64 Ultimately, there will be a conflict between 
the cable operator as originator and the cable operator as car-
rier. There will be an interest in restricting output (i.e., chan-
nel space and time), raising prices, and reducing competition 
for the cable operator's own programming (whether advertis-
ing-supported, or for pay or for both). Both from an antitrust 
perspective and a first amendment perspective, this would be a 
harmful result. 
Another issue which distinguishes cable from broadcast 
television involves federal allocation of program categories 
among regulated media. Earlier this Article indicated that the 
61. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F .2d 1025, 1038 (8th Cir. 1978), ajf'd, 
99 S. Ct. 1435 ( 1979). 
62. Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 29, at 189-93. 
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970). 
64. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1977). 
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federal government had the power to reserve certain frequency 
allocations for news and for children's television. Probably the 
government could go further and prohibit VHF stations from 
showing more recent films, reserving them instead for UHF 
outlets. 
But does the government have the additional power to re-
strict certain program categories to one regulated medium by 
precluding their sale or delivery to other media? The question 
here, of course, is whether it is constitutional for the FCC to 
deny pay distributors the right to place motion picutres over 
cable until there have been certain clearance procedures with 
broadcast nonpay television. 
I have my doubts about this practice as did the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home Box Ojfice.65 
That kind of restrictive practice would be highly suspect and 
must be clearly justified. But one might be tempted to go fur-
ther, holding it to be a violation of the first amendment for the 
federal government to limit the ability of any distributor of 
speech to avail himself of the supply of speech from a prospec-
tive merchant of speech.66 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF 
DIVERSITY 
Thus far, I have focused narrowly on first amendment im-
plications of specific structural interventions designed to affect 
diversity in television. I have tried to suggest some categories 
for analysis because of a fear that most generalizations about 
first amendment policy implications are not as all-encompass-
ing in their applicability as they are often represented to be. 
It is often said, for example, that first amendment objec-
tives are better served by a multitude of voices than by concen-
65. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 98 S. Ct. 
621 (1978). See also Weaver v. Jordon, 64 Cal. 2d 235,411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 
537, cert denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966). 
66. Two caveats should be noted here: I have suggested earlier that if a distrib-
utor is using a federal resource like the spectrum, a classification scheme may be 
appropriate so as to advance certain federal goals. There is difficulty, however, in 
determining which activities should be so regulated. Additionally, one may ask, as 
was previously mentioned, whether the distributor should be free from such re-
straints by virtue of being a full-fledged member of "the press." 
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tration.67 That may or may not be the case and depends on the 
nature of incentives within the system. In the newspaper in-
dustry, economies of scale have often led to dominant single 
newspaper cities.68 It is sometimes, though not necessarily al-
ways, desirable to have farge media organizations with ade-
quate investigatory resources to serve as critic. In European 
television, government organizations, managing a monopoly 
media, may be more successful in achieving diversity through 
the management of objectives than is the system of three com-
peting private-networks seeking, by and large, a segment of the 
same audience.69 The first amendment goals are not necessar-
ily incompatible with a strengthened and more centralized 
public broadcasting service. 70 
It is also said that the first amendment implies, if it does 
not always compel, a hands-off attitude by government.71 The 
first part of this Article attempted to indicate the need for more 
rigorous analysis in determining when governmental classifica-
tion or regulation in fact abridges speech. It is also fairly clear 
that the laissez-faire approach is not correct if it implies that 
particular incentives and enhancement efforts by the govern-
ment are not warranted. The United States can provide a sub-
67. Judge Learned Hand wrote that the interest in dissemination of news from 
many different sources: 
is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by 
the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely 
to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of 
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be folly, but we 
have staked upon it our all. 
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), q(/'d, 326 
U.S. I (1945). 
Such values also are implicit in the first amendment policy of "uninhibited, 
robust and wide open" debate. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
68. The Newspaper Preservation Act attempted to lead economies of scale into 
the service of diversity by permitting two newspapers in the same city to enter into a 
joint operating agreement if one was in danger of folding. 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) 
(1970). 
69. But such government controlled media operations, at times, have disserved 
the interests of diversity. The French government-owned media, for instance, has 
been criticized for its performance as a state propaganda tool during national crises 
over Suez and Algeria and during the country's 1968 riots. See Media and the First 
Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 871, 1031 (1972). 
10. See, e.g ., CARNEGIE COMMISSION, A PUBLIC TRUST: THE LANDMARK RE-
PORT OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
(1979). 
11. Id. at 871-79. 
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sidy for second class mail so as to promote the health of 
magazines; 72 it can provide funds for a national public broad-
casting corporation to sponsor programs for noncommercial 
outlets;73 it can legitimate certain otherwise illegal activities by 
legislation such as the Newspaper Preservation Act.74 
Another first amendment guide that has some currency 
suggests that governmental steps that enhance speech may be 
lawful, while governmental steps that do not enhance speech 
are not.75 The problem with this rule is not in its goals, which 
are beyond reproach, but with its application. It seems that 
agencies often have little basis for determining whether a par-
ticular rule or restriction will, in fact, enhance speech, even 
though enhancement is clearly the objective. And courts, seek-
ing to review the correctness of an agency determination as to 
the enhancement value of a regulation, usually have to resort 
even more to speculation in determining whether a rule should 
be upheld or not. 
The first amendment alone is not a secure guide to anti-
trust policy. Where anticompetitive practices exist, such as re-
fusals to deal, price-fixing or tying arrangements, it should be 
as appropriate to apply antitrust principles in the media area as 
in any other. But the ambi~uity of speech consequences of var-
ious forms of government mterventlon is such that there is no 
special reason to focus on the media as opposed to anticompe-
titive abuses in other areas of the economy. In<!_eed, the lesson 
of Citizens Publishing76 and Times-Picayune77 may be that ef-
fective enforcement of antitrust laws may be less likely or less 
enduring when newspapers are directly affected than when the 
72. Indirect subsidization of magazines in the form of lower postal rates has 
been regarded as one of the most significant contributions to the first amendment 
interest in diversity. Ablard and Harris, The Post Office and the Publisher's Purse-
s/rings: A Study of the Second Class Mailing Permit, 30 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 567, 
601 (1962) . But Congress backed away from such affirmative action and opened the 
way to higher second class rates by deciding that mail must pay its own way under 
an independent postal service. 39 U.S.C. § 3622 (1976). The government still could 
subsidize periodicals by adding such a subsidy to the subjects of appropriations 
under 39 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976). 
73. Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99 (1970). 
74. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1801-04 (1976). 
75. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 n.82 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 621 (1978). 
76. Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). 
77. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
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target of antitrust attack is a less politically impressive indus-
try. On th~ other hand, as we know from the Associated Press 
case, the fact that the media are involved does not mean that 
there is a shield from antitrust enforcement.78 
CONCLUSION 
What is left, perhaps, is the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion: not only in terms of what cases to bring, what dragons 
to slay, but also in terms of an overall vision, a sense of imper-
fections in the present structure of the media that can be cor-
rected by architectural intervention rather than program 
regulation. I think the debate over the last decade concerning 
the appropriate role that cable should play in the national me-
dia structure is a promising example of the kind of broad anal-
ysis that must be done continuously by the FTC, the FCC, the 
Justice Department and the Department of Commerce, so that 
the proper course can be charted. And in designing such a 
structure consistent with first amendment policies, one would 
hope for an architecture in which both diversity and access 
could have their play with a minimum of contingent govern-
ment ~ntrusion. 
There are several characteristics which would be desirable 
as part of the emerging architecture of a more first amend-
ment-sensitive media structure. These would include reducing 
restrictions on pay television so that there can be a more sub-
stantial market system between suppliers and purchasers of 
programs, encouraging program access to cable on a common 
carrier basis, reducing the barriers to ownership that preclude 
the spread of cable, encouraging multi-channel satellite distri-
bution, leaving newspapers more or less alone (except for an-
ticompetitive abuses) and embracing Geller-like principles79 
for minimizing government intrusion in the enforcement of 
fairness doctrine principles. 
For me, the first amendment sets a tone for, as well as 
some outer limits to, the kind of intervention that the govern-
78. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I (1945). 
79. See, e.g., Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in Television: Problems 
and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. R EV . 471 (1975); Communications Law, 63 G EO. L. 
J. 39(1974); Does Red Lion Square with Tomillo , 29 U. MIAMI L. R Ev . 477 ( 1975); A 
Modest Proposal to Modes/ Reform of the Federal Communications Commission, 63 
G EO. L. J. 705 (1975). 
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ment can make. But there is a peril in trying, too deliberately, 
to implement the goals of free speech, with insufficient atten-
tiveness to the restrictions such implementation appears to im-
pose on government and the media. Where there is haste to act 
to achieve what seem to be obvious first amendment goals, I 
suggest attention to Justice Stewart's ominous warning in the 
CBS case of "the dangers that beset us when we lose sight of 
the First Amendment itself, and march forth in blind pursuit of 
its values."80 
80. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 146 (1973) (Stewart, J. , con-
curring). 
